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This paper reports an intensive longitudinal case study carried out in a Portuguese 
manufacturing organisation in which attempts to promote change through management 
accounting were made in recent years. In a first pilot visit to the organisation, two 
puzzling observations were made. Firstly, and particularly in the manufacturing area of 
the organisation, management accounting systems introduced in recent years were not 
being used in everyday interactions and practices. Secondly, a newly introduced ERP 
system was having no apparent impact on management accounting or on the work of 
management accountants. We found that these observations were related to issues of 
power. There were different and conflicting conceptions of which rules should be 
followed in the manufacturing area, and strategic attempts to enact those conceptions 
(or to resist alternative ones). This paper draws on the insights of the Circuits of Power 
(Clegg, 1989a) in order to explain, in theoretically informed manner, the puzzling 




Este artigo descreve um estudo de caso intensivo e longitudinal levado a cabo numa 
organização industrial portuguesa em que, em anos recentes, foram realizados esforços 
para promover mudança organizacional com base em novos sistemas de contabilidade 
de gestão. Duas observações relativamente inesperadas foram feitas na visita piloto à 
organização sob estudo. Primeiro, e especialmente na área industrial da organização, 
sistemas de contabilidade de gestão introduzidos recentemente não eram utilizados em 
interacções e práticas quotidianas. Em segundo lugar, um novo sistema informático – 
um Sistema de Planeamento de Recursos Empresariais (ou ERP, como usualmente são 
conhecidos estes sistemas) não estava a exercer qualquer influência nos sistemas de 
contabilidade de gestão e no trabalho dos contabilistas de gestão. A nossa conclusão foi 
a de que estas observações estavam relacionadas com aspectos de poder. Havia 
concepções diferentes e até antagónicas sobre as regras a seguir na área industrial, e 
manobras estratégicas para impor tais concepções ou para resistir concepções 
alternativas. O presente artigo apresenta um conjunto de ideias baseado na teoria de 
‘Circuitos de Poder’ (Clegg, 1989a), que nos permite explicar, de forma teoricamente 
enquadrada, as observações realizadas.  
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is financed by FEDER and Portuguese funds. 2 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there have been numerous calls for research adopting a processual stance 
in the study of management accounting and its change within organisations (Hopwood, 
1987; Chua, 1995; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Burns, 2000a; 2000b). These calls are 
based on the recognition that a static perspective has been mainstream in the literature: 
conventional approaches to management accounting envisage the techniques and 
systems described as being adopted by efficiency-seeking organisations and possible 
change is equated with movements from equilibrium situation to equilibrium situation. 
From its start, the research reported in this paper broadly aimed at looking at intra-
organisational change processes: describing and analysing narratives of 
change/reproduction of management accounting systems and practices within 
organisations. The paper reports a longitudinal in-depth case study of a Portuguese 
manufacturing organisation in which a process of organisational change has been 
attempted in recent years. The choice of this organisation was initially motivated by its 
recent introduction of a new information technology (henceforth, IT) – an Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) system. Indeed, early research aims pointed to an analysis of 
management accounting change/reproduction following the introduction of an ERP 
system. It was hoped that insights would be gained on the process of management 
accounting change (or reproduction) in the organisation by tracking events unfolding in 
a moment in which strong pressures for such change were likely to emerge.  
We were especially influenced by studies that had applied the insights of ‘Old 
Institutional Economics’ (OIE) to processes of management accounting change (e.g. 
Burns, 2000a; 2000b; Burns and Scapens, 2000)
1. The concepts of such studies could 
support, so we expected, the analysis of the relationship between ERP and management 
accounting systems. Namely, we hypothesised that the ERP system – given the type of 
impacts described in literature – would cause strong pressures for change in 
organisational rules and routines, and would eventually constitute a basis for 
institutional change. The description of how this would come about was our target. 
An early visit to the organisation – in January 2000 – aimed at exploring the feasibility 
of the research project generally informed by the previous objectives and theoretical 
ideas. Some important issues, however, were raised during this pilot visit that came to 
                                                 
1 We will refer to this research as ‘OIE-inspired’.  3 
reshape the research in subsequent stages. One aspect that came to our attention was the 
apparent absence of impact of the ERP system on management accounting systems and 
practices, or indeed of any relationship between them. The new IT was being 
implemented as a system supporting operations, and seemed neither to ‘suggest’ 
changes in the content of management accounting systems in place nor to produce 
changes in the way those systems were used in practice. Even in terms of production of 
management accounting, there were some surprising observations: management 
accountants responsible for preparing management accounting reports were not 
involved in the ERP implementation, and hence did not seem to take advantage of the 
supposed integrative characteristics of these systems, in order – for instance – to gain 
some control of the databases they needed to perform their tasks. These observations 
would be confirmed in subsequent visits throughout the study. 
Another key aspect raised in this initial visit was that formal management accounting 
systems were being decoupled from everyday practices. This was especially true of a 
specific area of the organisation – manufacturing – whose members  seemed almost 
exclusively concerned with a set of production and efficiency indicators calculated 
within that area, in the production control department. Reports and figures sent by the 
management control department were generally ignored in manufacturing. 
 
2.  THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
One important observation made in early visits to the organisation studied was that there 
were issues of power involved in the failure to ‘impose’ management accounting as the 
predominant technology of management in manufacturing; and that those issues were 
also at stake in the way the ERP system was being implemented, and in the relation this 
system established (or in the circumstance, failed to establish) with management 
accounting systems and practices. Specifically, there were attempts by one group to 
intervene in manufacturing through management accounting; and there was apparent 
resistance to such interventions. Management accounting systems were not accepted by 
all organisational actors and clearly there were conflicts around their significance and 
desirability. A divide between two conceptions of management was evident: some 
senior managers represented the organisation as desirably ‘managed by numbers’ at a 
distance, with delegation, self-motivation and responsibility through accounting; while 4 
others embraced a style of management more oriented to production figures and direct 
control.  
The introduction of a thematic of power in our work suggests that organisations are not 
merely ‘systems’ that respond to whatever pressures are posed on them, but rather may 
be sites where multiple and possibly conflicting goals (external or internal to its legal 
boundaries) clash. Under this view, it is likely that power and politics (i.e. the struggles 
and strategies to acquire power) shape what organisational phenomena, including 
management accounting, are and become. This has been recognised in the management 
accounting literature, and studies have attempted to introduce the concepts of power and 
politics in understanding management accounting and its roles (e.g. Miller and O’Leary, 
1987; Hopper and Armstrong, 1991; Bougen, 1994; Miller, 1994; Chua, 1995; Burns 
and Scapens, 2000; Burns, 2000a). However, some have argued that the linkages 
between accounting and conflict, power and politics remain relatively unexplored 
(Miller, 1994).  
Further, our review of the concept of power soon revealed to us a field characterised by 
complexity and multiple voices (Hardy and Clegg, 1996; see also Clegg, 1989a; Robson 
and Cooper, 1989). Indeed, our representation of the concept ‘power’ evolved 
considerably throughout this research. Specifically, there was a progressive shift from a 
limited view of power as manifested in visible conflict situations in which actors or 
groups with specific and relatively well-defined interests draw upon resources to 
achieve outcomes; towards a broader conception of power and the circuits through 
which it flows (Clegg, 1989a). These aspects are briefly tackled in section 3. 
That broader conception of power brings about important consequences for the study of 
management accounting in organisations. Management accounting may be involved in 
strategic attempts to fix or reshape new obligatory rules underlying social interactions 
and practices in a social system. However, such attempts are not likely to produce 
linear, ‘as intended’, effects. Prevailing configurations of circuits of power may 
facilitate, but also hinder those strategic attempts, and counter-strategies and contingent 
events may occur. These are the basic ideas of the theoretical framework deployed in 
this research, as described in section 4. 5 
It was thus on the basis of a narrative of strategies of power that we framed the analysis 
of the case, and attempted to address the research puzzles outlined above. This is 
described in section 5. In section 6, we draw out some conclusions of the research. 
 
3.  THE CIRCUITS OF POWER 
The ‘circuits of power’ framework (Clegg, 1989a; see also 1989b; 1994) departs from 
the idea that an individual or collective actor will be powerful if her/his/its powers are 
solidly fixed in relational terms: if, given rules that are recurrently followed in 
interpretations, social relations and practices, that actor is capable of achieving goals in 
multiple contexts. In this situation, the actor has considerable discretion over the power 
of a collective.  
However, and given the character of power as diffused, contingent and emergent, such 
an advantaged position should not be seen in essentialist terms. Power is not essentially 
located in an individual or group. It is a property of a field of relations in which 
certainly some may be advantaged towards others, but in which total control of social 
powers by one single sovereign will seldom be the case. This is a Foucauldian 
conception of power (Foucault, 1977; 1982). As Deleuze (1986) puts it, for Foucault 
networks of power are:  
Simultaneously local, unstable and diffuse, do not emanate from a central 
point or unique locus of sovereignty, but at each moment move from one 
point to another, in a field of forces, making inflections, resistances, 
twists and turns, when one changes direction, or retraces one’s steps, this 
is why they are not ‘localized’ at any given moment (p. 73). 
 
The analysis in terms of circuits of power allows for the conceptualisation of how, 
despite the instability and contingency of the view of power expressed in the above 
statement, some relations of power become stable across space and time. The very term 
‘circuits’ conveys the idea of conduits through which social relations regularly flow. 
Sometimes, conduits may be tight and close off courses of action alternative to those 
that are fixed through them.  
Three types of circuit are at stake. The episodic circuit of power is the most visible one, 
consisting of actions conducted by actors engaged in social relations. A powerful actor 
is one capable of recurrently achieving desired outcomes at an episodic level, either 6 
through the mobilisation of available resources or ‘at a distance’, by being able to count 
on the disciplined and enabled actions of many others. Importantly, an actor may deploy 
resources to achieve certain outcomes, and nevertheless causal powers may not manifest 
themselves. Resistance may take place whatever the consolidation of an actor’s power 
as something owned and apparently ‘essential’ to that actor. No universal laws are 
capable of guaranteeing the power attached to specific actors and/or resources across 
contexts of action. 
The analysis of the circuits of power does not limit itself to a causal conception of 
power which might be traced back to Hobbes (1839; 1968) and Hume (1969), and that 
has been mainstream in modern political science
2. Indeed, the achievement of outcomes 
(i.e. the manifestation of causal powers) will be dependent on the stabilisation of the 
response of subordinated actors through the fixing of the network of power relations. 
For example, orders given by a manager to an employee will routinely result in effective 
actions by the employee only if the appropriate standing conditions are fixed: the 
employee interprets the meaning of the orders as intended by the manager; the 
employee is disciplined to accept the orders as ‘legitimate’ and to use his bodily 
capacities in following them; and finally he is enabled in doing so – i.e., he possesses 
the adequate means to follow those orders. 
In general, the attaining of outcomes in the episodic circuit depends on organisation. 
That is, on the stabilisation of the appropriate standing conditions for that achievement 
to be routine. These conditions can be seen at two levels: rules and their following; and 
material conditions. These are reflected in the two remaining circuits of power: the 
circuits of social and system integration, a distinction inspired in the classical work of 
Lockwood (1964).  
Social integration refers to the ‘relations between people’ in a social system. It is in 
this circuit that we find the normative dimension, the rules of meaning and membership 
whose fixing gives stability to the configuration of power in the episodic circuit. The 
analysis in this circuit marks a move towards a dispositional conception of power which 
assumes that power exists independently of its exercise. The classical causal conception 
focuses on situations in which effects of power are produced, thus escaping the key 
                                                 
2 Under such a conception, power is to be studied in terms of the effects created by an entity (an ‘agent’) on another 
one (a ‘patient’): power is the cause capable of producing such effects. For instance, authors engaged in the 
‘Community Power Debate’ (e.g. Dahl, 1957; 1961; Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; 1963) tend to equate the presence of 
power with its (more or less eventful) exercise. 7 
question of what constitutes power. That is, what constructs a powerful actor, capable of 
recurrently producing (whatever kind of) effects? Barnes (1988: 3-4) advances the 
example of an engine in a car. Clearly, the engine produces effects, such as the 
movement of the car. But the power of the engine is not merely to be equated with such 
effects. One may analyse the building of the engine in order to explain what fixes its 
power. At stake here is a realist conception (Harré and Madden, 1975) as opposed to an 
empiricist positivistic one.  
Realism has been applied to the social sciences (e.g. Bhaskar, 1975), and specifically to 
the study of power (Ball, 1976; Benton, 1981). The key contention here is that human 
beings have intrinsic powers to produce specific effects in specific conditions, in a 
manner similar to an engine. However, there are obvious and crucial differences. These 
powers are not covered by laws, but rather are fixed in and through rules that are 
enacted by individuals who participate in social relations.  
Rules may be more or less formalised, more or less shared and more or less deeply 
seated. For instance, we may be talking in this circuit of deep-seated values and beliefs 
of individuals that, if widely shared in a specific social setting, may become 
institutionalised. Already stable members of a social system may ‘know and follow the 
rules’ prevailing in that social system. Routines may be available allowing actors to 
perform interactions in relatively recurrent and ontologically secure fashion, as OIE-
inspired writers in management accounting (see above) point out. However, less stable 
situations are always a possibility. Breaches of membership, caused by problems of 
meaning or discipline, may occur. Importantly, rules are often seen as external objects 
to the subject who considers and attempts to act upon them. In some situations at least, 
individuals may assume an external and even strategic stance towards rules prevailing in 
their social system.  
Also to be considered is the possibility that, in a specific social system, alternative and 
even conflicting sets of rules are available for meaning giving and for affirmations of 
membership. In this situation, the configuration of the circuit of social integration is not 
tightly built. An actor aiming to achieve a powerful status – by leading others to follow 
rules that protect her/his objectives – may be confronted with alternative rules and with 
strategies, by other actors, to impose these. Nevertheless, it is possible – in social 
systems characterised by the presence of different sets of rules – that some such rules 8 
become obligatory and widely followed. A third circuit of power may assume an 
important rule in guaranteeing such stabilisation. 
Indeed, movements to fix specific rules as the basis for interpretations, interactions and 
practices across time and space will often pass through the circuit of system 
integration, in the form of the material conditions prevailing in a social system (Clegg, 
1989a). On the one hand, this circuit involves prior distributions of resources. That is, 
specific rules may become obligatory in a social system – fixing strong dispositional 
powers for certain actors – because multiple resources are mobilised in strategies to 
sediment those rules (e.g. financial resources may be available to introduce disciplinary 
technologies). Also, the circuit of system integration is linked to manifestations of 
power in the microphysics of everyday life; i.e., to power’s capability to reach the on-
going actions of individuals, producing (self-) discipline through its normalising and 
routinising character. Importantly, certain technologies – such as management 
accounting (see below) – may have an important role in creating such effects, given 
their ability to open up lines of visibility or to create ‘centres of calculation’ (e.g. 
various articles in Munro and Mouritsen, 1996).  
Also, in analysing the circuit of system integration, Clegg (1989a) highlights the 
technologies of production alongside those of discipline. This emphasises that the 
constitution of powerful actors potentially brings about productive effects. Powerful 
actors are those capable of enrolling multiple actors to their representations, and to 
intervene (in all moments and spaces, possibly ‘at a distance’) in streams of conduct and 
action. If actions of those enrolled are enabled by suitable technologies of production, 
the power of the enrolling actor will also be increased. For instance, an actor will be 
especially powerful if material conditions (e.g. management accounting, information 
and manufacturing technologies, appropriate distributions of resources) are in place that 
allow for outcomes ‘desired’ by that actor. 
In the interpretation of the ‘circuits of power’ framework advanced in this paper, it is 
noted that the stabilisation of obligatory rules in a social system can explain the 
(relational) constitution of powerful actors, capable of achieving outcomes across 
multiple contexts of action. But how to analyse processes leading to the fixing of new 
obligatory rules? The insights from the Sociology of Translation or Actor-Network 
Theory (henceforth ANT; see Callon and Latour, 1981; Callon and Law, 1982; Callon, 
1986; 1992; Law, 1986; Latour, 1987; 1991) are proposed by Clegg (1989a) to analyse 9 
the dynamics of circuits of power. The emphasis is on how a network of power relations 
(or, in Clegg’s terms, a configuration of circuits of power) is produced and reproduced 
through time following attempts by actors to grow and achieve a more powerful status.  
ANT constitutes a Machiavellian approach to the study of power. Rather than showing a 
concern with distributions of power or with a critique of such distributions, ANT studies 
attempt to ‘follow actors’, describing their strategies of power and the effects created by 
such strategies. Indeed, the central purpose of ANT is to explain how networks of 
power relationships are constituted and stabilised, that is ‘describing the way in which 
actors are defined, associated and simultaneously obliged to remain faithful to their 
alliances’ (Callon, 1986: 224). In short, and to use the above terms, to describe and 
explain how new configurations of circuits of power emerge as the result of strategies 
deployed by actors to grow and gain in power. If this is successful, translation may be 
said to have occurred. 
 
4.  A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK – STRATEGIES OF POWER, ORGANISATIONAL 
CHANGE/REPRODUCTION PROCESSES AND THE POSSIBLE ROLES OF 
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 
Figure 1 represents in schematic form the theoretical framework which, based on the 
ideas described in the previous section, will be deployed in the analysis of the case 
study presented in section 5 below. The fundamental proposition of this theoretical 
framework is that organisational change processes may be the result of representations 
proposed, and strategies conducted, by actors operating in and around an organisation. 
The term ‘representation’ is used here to describe putative (i.e. not yet and not 
necessarily actualised or enacted) sets of rules of meaning and membership that underlie 
interactions and practices of actors in a social system.  
A strategic actor may propose, and embark on a strategy in order to enact, the rules to 
be followed by many other actors in an organisation. In the terms usually deployed in 
ANT literature, a new set of rules is presented as a solution to problems identified by 
the strategic – or enrolling – actor. If the problems identified are accepted, and the 
solutions proposed enacted, by enrolled actors, new sets of rules may become obligatory 
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Figure 1: a framework for studying organisational change processes 
 
 
4.1. Power strategies and the configuration of circuits of power 
The enactment of representations, that is, the fixing of new rules followed in the 
organisation studied, will potentially mean a change in configurations of circuits of 
power. However, as suggested in the figure above, processes leading to that enactment 
are in turn enhanced or restricted by existing circuits of power. For instance, the 
prospects of enactment of a proposed representation will probably be higher if 
prevailing obligatory rules of meaning and membership are not challenged. A strategic 
actor proposing a new representation to a commercial department may attempt to 
substitute rules of orientation to contribution margins for prevailing rules of orientation 
to sales value. If strong rules of financial orientation are institutionalised in that 
department, it is likely that the acceptance and enactment of the new rules will be 
facilitated, as OIE-inspired authors would suggest. In this example, new rules of 
meaning and membership are introduced, but they are consistent with other ones that are 11 
not challenged: a strategy of change in the configuration of circuits of power is framed 
(in the circumstance, facilitated) by that same configuration. 
Also, a strategy may be facilitated (or hindered) by existing material conditions, 
including distributions of resources and available technologies of discipline and 
production. As suggested above, it is to a great extent through this last circuit of power 
(of system integration) that change in rules of meaning and membership is made 
possible. Coming back to the previous example, one may conceive a situation of 
confusion in the commercial department following the attempted introduction of the 
new rules. For instance, if there is no timely and reliable information available to enable 
the new orientation to contribution margins. Here, the introduction of a powerful 
information system may be facilitative. Such an introduction may also be facilitative in 
situations of resistance to the proposed changes – e.g. if the commercial department was 
previously oriented to sales volumes and actors in that department are not disposed to 
follow the new rules. Here, the technology may open up lines of visibility and produce 
disciplinary effects. Once more, in these examples, change in the configuration of 
circuits of power (i.e. enactment of new rules) is framed (in the circumstance, enhanced) 
by prevailing circuits (i.e. available technologies of discipline and production). 
It is not implied by the previous paragraph that the enactment and sedimentation of new 
rules in a social system will always depend on available technologies of discipline and 
production. For instance, in many situations it may be the case that rules become 
sedimented through a process of ‘natural’ routinisation and progressive taken-for-
grantedness, as OIE-inspired authors would argue. However, we do intend to imply that 
in some cases at least the promotion and sedimentation of rules is facilitated or even 
made possible by the effects of those technologies.  
As the scheme above suggests, prevailing circuits of power may also hinder the 
strategies being conducted. This will be the case, for instance, if prevailing rules or 
existing material conditions facilitate counter-representations and strategies by other 
actors. Also, it is possible to conceive that existing sedimented rules resist change (e.g. 
because they are taken-for-granted). Finally, available material conditions may limit the 
strategies being conducted: no resources or adequate technologies of discipline and 
production may be available, or the existing material conditions fix obligatory rules that 
resist changes being attempted. These examples constitute possible situations of 12 
resistance to change that are capable of being accommodated within the proposed 
theoretical framework. 
 
4.2. The non-linearity of the effects of power strategies: counter-
  representations    and strategies, contingent events, reshaped 
 strategies 
The set of rules that are actually enacted in an organisation are conceptualised here as 
the outcome of past representations and strategies to enact them. If a specific set of rules 
becomes obligatory for organisational actors, one may talk of a strong configuration of 
circuits of power: no alternative conduits, i.e. no alternative sets of rules, are available 
for actors to give meanings to situations and others, and to affirm their membership. As 
mentioned before, this is potentially facilitated if suitable technologies of discipline and 
production are in place. However, if such technologies are not available or not 
appropriate, circuits of power may be less tightly built: there may be alternative sets of 
rules in the circuit of social integration, alternative conduits that actors may follow. 
Indeed, it is possible that different and potentially competing representations are 
exchanged and fought over in a specific organisation at a certain time. 
In this situation, it is likely that a reconfiguration of circuits of power is not the linear 
outcome of successful power strategies conducted by specific strategic actors. Hence, to 
understand the fate of proposed representations, the present framework argues for a 
description of the movements undertaken by strategic actors to enact those 
representations. However, other actors may fail to accept them, and even propose 
counter representations and conduct counter strategies. Finally, contingent events and 
factors may be relevant to the unfolding of events. Emerging here is a picture of relative 
unpredictability in organisational change processes: it is most likely that no single actor 
is capable of ‘pulling all the strings’. Seldom will representations outlined at the outset 
be enacted in smooth linear fashion. Possibly, initial representations and/or strategies 
may have to be redefined.  
 
4.3. Possible roles of management accounting in organisational change processes 
Management accounting may be involved in producing and reproducing configurations 
of the circuits of power in organisations. We contend that the fixing of dispositional 13 
powers is centrally conducted in and through rules that may be carried by management 
accounting systems. Further, we contend that management accounting may constitute a 
technology of discipline and production involved in the fixing of, and not only in 
carrying and suggesting, rules that are enacted in everyday interpretations, social 
relations and practices. 
 
Management accounting as a carrier of rules 
Management accounting can be envisaged as a carrier of rules that may or may not 
become obligatory in specific organisations. That is, such rules can become 
institutionalised and become the prevailing basis for interactions and practices. A 
management accounting system like a budgeting or performance evaluation system 
points to rules of orientation to financial results.  
Hence, organisational actors may give meaning to situations in terms of financial 
figures – for example, they may assess the operational decisions they are faced with in 
terms of their impact on budget variances or some performance indicator. Interactions 
with other actors may also be rooted in management accounting rules. For instance, a 
conversation taking place in the organisation, or an order, may be facilitated by the use 
of financial figures. Management accounting rules may also constitute a basis for 
membership in the organisation. The definition of appropriate or inappropriate 
behaviour for oneself or others may be defined by reference to financial figures or 
financial categorisations. 
An issue that can be raised at this point is whether management accounting always has 
the capacity to become a privileged basis for the definition of rules of meaning and 
membership enacted in organisations. This issue may be linked with the theoretical 
framework presented before: management accounting may or may not become, in 
specific organisations, a central source of rules of meaning and membership depending 
on the way it is involved in the representations, and strategies to enact those 
representations, within the prevailing circuits of power. 
To understand the fate of representations based on management accounting rules, one 
will have to analyse strategies conducted to enact those representations, and the events 
and counter-strategies that potentially ensue. Prevailing rules of meaning and 
membership may enhance or hinder those strategies, and thus the enactment of the 14 
proposed representations. For instance, and as neo-OIE writers have shown, if rules of 
financial orientation are widely institutionalised in an organisation it is likely that a 
strategy to impose a supposedly ‘better’ management accounting system will be 
facilitated. On the contrary, if other bases for meaning and membership prevail, for 
instance if financial values are widely perceived with suspicion, it is likely that such an 
imposition will be more difficult. 
One issue that remains is how can specific management accounting rules be enacted if 
they confront other, conflicting, rules of meaning and membership prevailing in a 
specific organisation? In institutionalist studies (particularly in OIE-inspired writings) it 
is typically the case that if conflict between newly proposed and prevailing rules does 
not occur, then change takes place. If conflict occurs resistance tends to emerge and 
change is likely to fail. The framework presented in this paper allows for the study of 
the processes through which new rules become capable of overthrowing previous ones. 
The conditions for this to be possible are to be found in an analysis of the circuits of 
power. As Clegg (1989a) highlights, it is primarily through changes in the circuit of 
system integration that change in the rules enacted in a social system can come about. In 
the next section, I will suggest that management accounting can also intervene in this 
circuit. 
  
Management accounting as technology of discipline and production 
Management accounting systems are not only ‘rule books’. They not only transmit a set 
of rules of financial orientation, but also – potentially – provide for the very following 
of those rules. There is a material dimension to management accounting, reflected 
mainly in the disciplinary and productive characteristics of management accounting 
reports and figures. For instance, a performance evaluation system probably involves, 
on the one hand, a set of rules such as an orientation to specific measures of financial 
performance. On the other hand, such a system will also involve the production of 
reports that render the following (or non-following) of those rules visible in multiple 
time-space contexts, such as performance evaluation meetings. Therefore, it is likely 
that attempts to implement management accounting in organisations will not merely 
involve the proposal and communication of specific rules, but also the creation of 
material conditions conducive to their enactment. 15 
Hence, management accounting systems may constitute not only a carrier of rules of 
meaning and membership that may or may not become obligatory in specific settings. 
These systems may also function as technologies of discipline and production, 
facilitating the interpretation and following of those rules. Specifically, management 
accounting may (1) create lines of visibility (or centres of calculation) that produce 
surveillance effects, potentially promoting discipline; and (2) facilitate the interpretation 
and following of rules, by providing timely and adequate information capable of aiding 
everyday decisions and actions. 
The first of these characteristics points to the potential panoptical effects of 
management accounting systems. Actors in the organisation may know that their 
conformity or non-conformity to the rules of meaning and membership dictated by such 
systems are subject to a permanent gaze. Lines of visibility into the actions and 
performance of specific actors are opened, and the existence of some assessment or 
normalising criteria guarantees an orientation to the rules carried by management 
accounting systems. Disciplinary effects – that is, disposition to follow the rules – may 
therefore be created.  
The creation of disciplinary effects by management accounting systems must, however, 
be seen in terms of prevailing circuits of power. For instance, an employee working in 
the customer’s service department is faced with a recently developed system of financial 
indicators of performance that advises her to give priority to profitable customers over 
less profitable ones. However, she knows that this system is not the main basis for her 
performance assessment. The organisational structure is highly hierarchical, and her 
hierarchical superior does not accept the terms of the new management accounting 
system. If no means are available to discipline this last individual, it is possible that 
rules followed in the department will be insulated from the rules dictated by that system. 
However, even if dispositions are created for the enactment of rules dictated by a 
specific management accounting system, such enactment may not occur. For instance, a 
system of contribution margins by geographical area may be implemented, and reports 
assessed in board meetings. However, a sales manager responsible for a certain 
geographical area may simply not know how to orient everyday decisions and actions in 
order to increase the contributions of her area. Here, the problem is that rules do not 
provide for their own interpretation: different meanings may be attached to the 
supposedly same rules. One manager may wrongly believe that increasing sales 16 
volumes will necessarily lead to better contribution margins. Other manager may 
understand that selling to non-profitable customers may have a negative effect on those 
margins. But even if all sales managers interpret the rules being transmitted, and even 
understand that sales to non-profitable customers are to be avoided, there may still be a 
problem: how to identify these customers?  
These examples point to the above-mentioned second potential characteristic of 
management accounting systems as a technology of discipline and production. Here, at 
stake are the enabling features of these systems. They may allow for the enactment of a 
representation of the sales departments as oriented to rules leading to improved 
contribution margins. For instance, if an adequate system is enacted, involving simple 
and reliable indicators that are provided to sales managers on a timely basis, it is 
possible that the rules enacted at the operational level will be aligned with that 
representation: non-profitable customers will be avoided, and an orientation to 
contribution margins will be achieved.  
 
5.  THE CASE STUDY 
The organisation studied is Air, an independent business unit of a large and diversified 
Portuguese group, which we will call Goldberg, based in the North West of Portugal, 
near Porto
3. Air vertically integrates the business chain across various separate 
companies: the headquarters is in Portugal, including the administrative and commercial 
areas together with the manufacturing area; and several sales companies are spread 
around Europe (twelve to thirteen companies during the time of the study).  
By the mid 1990’s, top management – namely a newly appointed Managing Director 
(MD) –attempted to promote organisational change. In several interviews with top 
management, and indeed in documents to which we had access, principles of ‘self-
discipline and motivation’ and ‘responsibility for, and orientation to, contributions to 
organisational profits’, framed the representations by the MD of rules to be recurrently 
followed throughout the organisation. 
Our study focused on the attempts made to enrol the manufacturing area of the business 
to those representations. In this area, individuals with whom we talked seemed almost 
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exclusively concerned with a set of production and efficiency indicators calculated 
within manufacturing, in the production control (PC) department. Reports and figures 
sent by the management control department (which had recently been created by the 
MD) were generally ignored in manufacturing. 
The description of the case will attempt to address the key aspects of the framework 
presented in figure 1 in section 4 above. We will start in section 5.1 by describing the 
situation in the organisation in the mid-1990’s, in terms of prevailing circuits of power. 
After that, in section 5.2, we will describe the new representations emerging in the 
organisation by that time, and the way management accounting was involved in the 
attempt to enact such representations. Finally, in section 5.3, we will briefly explore the 
way prevailing circuits of power impinged on strategies and counter-strategies 
undertaken in the organisation in the late 1990’s, and we will describe some contingent 
events that occurred in that period. The analysis of all these aspects allowed us to make 
sense of the fate of the initially proposed representations, directly addressing, in 
processual fashion, the research puzzles expressed in section 1 above: why were formal 
management accounting systems decoupled from everyday practices in manufacturing; 
and how to account for the lack of impact of the ERP system on management 
accounting/accountants. 
 
5.1.  The configuration of the circuits of power in the organisation by the mid-     
        1990’s 
Two traits of the institutional context of the organisation studied were evident from our 
preliminary observations in early 2000
4. Firstly, there was a wide recognition of the 
authority of the family that owned the group of companies to which Air belonged. 
Secondly, in Air’s manufacturing, rules of production orientation were sedimented 
despite the management accounting systems in place which seemed to point to the 
following of rules of ‘contribution to organisational profits’.  
                                                 
4 A methodological note here: the research reported in this paper involved three visits to the organisation 
studied. The first visit was undertaken between the 3
rd and the 29
th of January 2000 and was a pilot one. 
The second visit took place between the 5
th of July and the 10
th of August 2000 and was the central one in 
our research: it was a theoretically informed visit, in which the key research puzzles were addressed and 
the line of argument was refined. The third visit took place between the 3
rd and the 24
th of July 2001, and 
served mostly to confirm some aspects raised in previous visits. These visits involved staying in the 
organisation throughout the respective periods. For more details regarding the methodological approach 
adopted, including the key decisions taken during the research process, and the research steps undertaken 
(preparation, data collection and analysis) see Ribeiro (2003).  18 
 
The authority of the family and the ‘Group Leader’ 
Goldberg is a family-run group. Originating from a small business, launched in the late 
19
th century, it grew considerably in the 1970’s and 1980’s with the third generation of 
the founder’s family. From a relatively small manufacturing group, with a line of 
products based on a specific type of raw material (the one mostly used in Air), Goldberg 
expanded not only through growth of its traditional activity, but it also moved into new 
areas – both in manufacturing and in services. In spite of this expansion, the family kept 
control of the business. This is reflected in the capital ownership. The near totality of 
Goldberg’s capital belongs to three grandsons of the founder.  
In general, there is wide recognition of the family’s authority within Goldberg. One of 
the three grandsons, in particular, has achieved a special status. He is widely recognised, 
within and outside the group, as Goldberg’s Leader
5. This points to a rule of meaning 
and membership that is widely sedimented in Goldberg: the authority of the Group 
Leader and the obligation on others to follow the rules he dictates, or in general, the 
obligation to please him. That is, the rule ‘following the Group Leader’ was well 
sedimented in Goldberg (including in Air) at the time of this study. 
Virtually all individuals we interviewed or talked with recognise the Group Leader’s 
word as final, and manifest total respect for him. Also, membership within the 
organisation is often associated with an orientation to the rules dictated by the Group 
Leader and even with the relationship established with him. We understood that the 
acceptance and following of values associated with the Group Leader (e.g. hard work, 
respect for hierarchies) were important sources of membership. Also, individuals seen 
as close to the him were respected organisational members. 
The rule of ‘following the Group Leader’ seemed to be taken-for-granted by most 
organisational members. However, we found some evidence that the sedimentation of 
this rule could not merely be associated with a ‘natural’ process of institutionalisation, 
as OIE-inspired authors would probably suggest. For instance, some interviewees were 
capable of articulating and even criticising the rule. In an informal conversation the 
controller stated: 
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The impact of [the Group Leader] in [Air] is too strong: sometimes I 
think that things would be easier if he did not care so much with 
controlling everything. 
 
Furthermore, it was possible to identify the (often material) basis on which the authority 
of the Group Leader rested, and even some of the strategies he conducted in order to fix 
the above rule as obligatory. Firstly, the family structure of capital ownership was 
retained. Indeed, the analysis of Goldberg’s reports showed that seven individuals from 
the fourth generation already hold key positions in Goldberg. The Group Leader himself 
controlled a majority of capital. In an interview with a Portuguese newspaper in 2000, 
the Group Leader stated that there were no plans to change that structure in the near 
future
6. The ownership of capital is related to the configuration of the circuits of power. 
It may be directly associated with the circuit of system integration or material 
conditions, since it promotes a specific distribution of resources (e.g. owners of capital 
have a privileged position in terms of the disposal of organisational resources) and it is 
also allied to a set of disciplinary devices (e.g. legal and enforcement apparatus that 
protect the rights of the owners of capital). Hence, by retaining capital ownership under 
his control, the Group Leader could maintain a strong position in terms of the circuit of 
system integration. This allowed him, for instance, to hire and fire employees and in 
general to decide on the use of organisational resources. 
A second basis on which the rule of ‘following the Group Leader’ was fixed is the 
strong hierarchical organisational structure. Rather than promoting delegation of 
authority, the Group Leader maintained a strongly hierarchical formal structure in which 
important decisions would be defined at the top. Such a structure constituted a strong 
material condition fixing the obligatory rule of ‘following the Group Leader’ in 
Goldberg. It meant that the making of key decisions at levels other than at the top of the 
group was illegitimate and sanctionable.  
A third way through which the rule of ‘following the Group Leader’ was fixed in 
Goldberg is more dynamic. The Group Leader did not simply rely on the effects of 
prevailing material conditions (capital ownership and formal hierarchies) to fix his 
authority as obligatory. He was very active in exploiting those material conditions in the 
strategies that he conducted. His intimidating recriminations of subordinates in meetings 
(some of which were witnessed during the research) had became legendary. Also, 
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individuals who entered Goldberg with ideas different from the him, or who challenged 
his opinions, were systematically (and notoriously) expelled. Once more, the 
widespread recognition of these facts led to a general acceptance of ‘following the 
Group Leader’ as an important rule to be followed.  
The obligatory character of this rule did not mean, however, that the Group Leader was 
able to achieve his preferred outcomes across all times and spaces. It is one thing to 
become recognised as the legitimate source of rules, but it is another thing, and 
potentially more complex, to be permanently capable of dictating and enacting the rules 
to be followed in all spaces and times in a growing group of companies. 
As suggested in the above theoretical discussion, material conditions may facilitate the 
enactment of rules across multiple contexts. However, for the Group Leader material 
conditions were not always facilitative. In a conversation between the Group Leader and 
a group of members of the management control department in Air’s refectory (where 
the Group Leader often had lunch), he somewhat nostalgically complained of the 
difficulty he was now having in keeping direct control over the business. He did so in 
more or less the following words: 
Before, I used to control everything through the fax machine and the 
terrestrial mail. Now it’s impossible. 
 
As suggested by the theoretical framework, power implies organisation, and 
organisation means controlling the actions of many others through the ability to fix 
appropriate rules, and to discipline and enable their following; i.e., to act at a distance. 
When Goldberg was a small group of companies, ‘action at a distance’ was, in a sense, 
unnecessary. Instead, there was ‘action at the proximity’. Direct communication of rules 
and direct control of the respective enactment could be conducted. Rules were simple 
and transmitted directly, thus potentially overcoming issues of interpretation. Also, 
discipline could be guaranteed, say, by the possibility of assessing decisions made the 
day before, through the analysis of a fax or a commercial letter. Hence, the necessary 
measures to enable and discipline the following of rules could be enforced.  
As the business grew in size and complexity, however, it became virtually impossible 
for the Group Leader to dictate and control all the rules to be followed (and how to 
follow them). The problem was that even the most detailed inscription (such as small 
plaques sent by the Group Leader to the group’s employees in the years 1998-2001, 21 
describing the principles that had oriented him in his successful professional life) might 
be insufficient. As a result, there were problems with the transmission of meanings 
across multiple contexts, not least given issues of indexicality and the presence of 
purposeful strategic resistance.  
As suggested above, such problems may be overcome by the deployment of 
technologies of discipline and production like management accounting. However, the 
Group Leader did not trust this technology. He considered management accounting 
reports as post-facto and not appropriate to intervene in everyday interpretations, social 
relations and practices. One of th researchers recalls, for instance, a conversation he 
held with the Group Leader, in which he identified management accounting as merely 
the computation of costs for financial reporting purposes.  
In any case, and even if the Group Leader was sensitive to the potential of management 
accounting as means to ‘act at a distance’, it is likely that powerful technologies of 
discipline and production were simply not available in the broader environment in 
which Goldberg was located. The conception of accounting (including management 
accounting) as oriented to the production of legal reports was (and in some cases still is) 
well sedimented in Portugal. This is, for instance, reflected in the teaching in 
Portuguese universities, often oriented to cost accounting and bookkeeping.  
In an attempt to overcome these problems, the Group Leader preferred and protected 
loyal collaborators, often relatives and friends, who supposedly accepted his word as 
final in all major decisions. These were his privileged representatives in organisations. 
 
Sedimented rules in Air’s manufacturing area 
This section discusses an observation also made in the first visit to the organisation in 
January 2000, and that came to shape the research from then on. Manufacturing 
managers and their subordinates were oriented to production measures, and above all to 
production volumes and machine usage. There was, in other words, a strong internal or 
capacity orientation. In a conversation with a manufacturing manager, the interlocutor 
referred to the high percentages of capacity usage in his department as a signal of good 
performance. However, levels of stocks in this area were notoriously high. In 
subsequent conversations with other manufacturing managers during this first visit, we 
detected that their key concerns were similar. Importantly, these sedimented rules in 22 
Air’s manufacturing may be understood in terms of the configuration of circuits of 
power in the business unit. These may in turn be linked to the group’s characteristics, 
described before.  
Indeed, a key aspect of Goldberg’s circuits of power in the early-to-mid 1990’s was the 
attempts to define and communicate rules ‘from above’. Vertical lines of hierarchy were 
well established. The Group Leader strived to control the group in a direct fashion 
through orders given to those below. From early contacts with Air it was noted that, at 
different hierarchical levels, organisational members (departments, functional areas) 
would always follow orders from hierarchical superiors. Organisational members 
(departments, functional areas) would orient themselves to follow – or to be seen as 
following – rules dictated from above. 
People are used to a hierarchical logic, in which people belong to a 
certain department and answer to a certain boss (the IS manager, summer 
2000). 
 
Today, we still have to solve problems (…) with the bosses. People don’t 
solve the problems horizontally (a member of the ERP implementation 
team, summer 2000). 
 
Here, people manage the boss. Not the organisation. If the boss is happy, 
I am happy (the ERP project champion, January 2000). 
 
In Air’s manufacturing, ‘the boss’ was the production director (henceforth, PD). He was 
at the top of the hierarchy in manufacturing, and hence – given the formal, strongly 
hierarchical, organisational structure, he had the authority to give orders and dictate the 
rules for those below him. Importantly, the PD’s preferred representations were linked 
to the rules of production orientation prevailing in his area. He did not see accounting 
systems as suitable technologies for managing the manufacturing area. In an interview, 
the PD stated quite explicitly that he doubted the adequacy of management accounting 
for control and performance evaluation or its usefulness for aligning everyday decisions 
in manufacturing with organisational performance.  
The position of the PD in the organisation’s hierarchy constituted an important feature 
of the circuit of system integration allowing him to impose his preferred representations 
of production orientation on those below him. But his authority in manufacturing in the 
mid-1990’s was linked to other characteristics of the group’s circuits of power. As 23 
mentioned before, the Group Leader would often rely on individuals of his trust – 
family members and personal friends – placing them in the highest levels of formal 
hierarchies, in order to be able to ‘be present’ in everyday affairs.  
In Air, in the early 1990’s, the PD was one of these individuals. The privileged 
relationship between the Group Leader and the PD was mentioned in several informal 
conversations within Air, although in formal recorded interviews it was not so easy to 
collect this kind of information. Nevertheless, two individuals from quite different 
functions stated on record that: 
[The PD] manoeuvres through [the Group Leader]. (…) [He] stayed in 
Air because [the Group Leader] wanted him there (the ERP project 
champion, summer 2001).  
 
The only channel [to the top of the group] is [the PD]. All other channels 
are closed (a manufacturing manager, summer 2000)
7. 
 
Hence, the orientation in Air’s manufacturing to the orders and rules dictated by the PD 
was magnified by the general recognition that he had a privileged relationship with the 
Group Leader. As the statements above suggest, the Group Leader trusted and protected 
the PD, and the latter was the Group Leader’s privileged source of information on Air’s 
manufacturing. The trust and protection of the Group Leader greatly empowered the PD 
in the organisation. While that trust and that protection were maintained, it was unlikely 
that the PD would loose his position as ‘the boss’ in manufacturing. 
The point to be made here is that characteristics of the circuit of system integration in 
the group, namely the absence of powerful material conditions, conspired to create this 
state of affairs. There were no clear and unambiguous lines of visibility into 
manufacturing performance at the time of this study. This allowed the PD to maintain 
the image that ‘everything was well’, and to undermine attempts by other actors in the 
organisation to disclose problems which were apparent within manufacturing. (e.g. 
dubious investments, high levels of stocks). 
                                                 
7 A methodological note here: in one of the interviews from which these statements were selected, the 
recorder was on and we understood the interviewee hesitated in several answers. In our second interview, 
we decided to switch off the recorder in order to confirm some interpretations that we had made of the 
first interview. This way, such interpretations could be (and indeed were) totally confirmed. We also 
crosschecked such interpretations in many other interviews and conversations in manufacturing, and the 
striking widespread agreement they raised confirmed them (they were seen as ‘obvious’ by virtually 
everybody).  24 
Several examples can illustrate the point that sensitive information regarding 
manufacturing performance was in some cases protected and in other cases ambiguous. 
Some individuals in the PC department – all loyal to the PD – had become guardians of 
data. They were the only ones capable of understanding the system and how to collect 
information. For example, these individuals were the only ones capable of 
understanding and extracting information for the cost accounts. These accounts included 
total costs figures, computed for legal reporting purposes, but were meaningless in 
terms of responsibility or performance evaluation. Furthermore, they were very 
sensitive to variations in machine usage and the responsibility for them was disputed 
between the commercial and manufacturing areas (ambiguity of information). 
Production and quality reports assembled in the PC department were not directly 
available to the rest of the organisation. They were computed on a parallel database 
outside the existing information system (a MRP-II JBA system running on AS400), 
using day-to-day paper-based production documents and were distributed only within 
the manufacturing area (protection of information). In any case, the JBA system had 
been the object of numerous changes and customisations over time, and had become a 
somewhat unreliable system. Importantly, the system did not identify mistakes or delays 
in data entries. Also, it included alternative databases which provided different figures 
for the supposedly same activities (ambiguity of information). All this meant that 
visibility of manufacturing performance was absent. This allowed the PD to persuade 
the Group Leader that any problems were caused elsewhere in the organisation, and to 
avoid strategies of other actors in the organisation to undermine his position.  
Up to now we have emphasised the way material conditions in the organisation – the 
existence of strong formal hierarchies and the absence of powerful technologies capable 
of opening up lines of visibility into manufacturing performance – reinforced the 
authority of the PD in Air’s manufacturing area. However, in addition, various means to 
discipline and enable manufacturing managers and their subordinates were available to 
the PD. For instance, there were technologies available for the PD to impose his 
preferred rules of production orientation on those below him. Specifically, we observed 
that the PD relied on reports containing production and quality indicators compiled by 
the PC department. These were regularly distributed to manufacturing managers and 
were the object of detailed monthly analyses in production meetings. We understood 
that the concern of manufacturing managers and their subordinates with production 25 
measures was due primarily to the effects of these reports. Manufacturing managers 
were aware of the lines of visibility into their performance that were opened by the 
production and quality reports, and they used them to enact an orientation to production 
levels in their departments. For example, two manufacturing managers stated that they 
regularly discussed these reports with their subordinates, including line operators. Those 
managers also highlighted the simplicity and ease of interpretation of the indicators and 
figures contained in the reports, which demonstrates their character as technologies of 
production, and not merely discipline.  
 
5.2. The introduction of new management accounting  systems:  emergent     
  representations in Air in the mid-1990’s  
The introduction of new management accounting systems in Air in the mid-1990’s was 
linked to the appointment of a new group of actors, namely the MD, as well as a new 
CFO and a controller (both appointed by the MD himself). The MD was formally at the 
top of Air’s hierarchy, with the PD, the CFO and a Sales and Marketing director 
immediately below him. 
The new actors proposed, and attempted to enact, a new representation of the 
organisation based on rules of financial orientation. Such rules were to be enacted 
through the creation of lines of visibility to the contribution of each area of the business, 
and ultimately of each department, to the financial results of the organisation as a 
whole, and through the introduction of performance evaluation systems based on this 
contribution. The new management accounting systems were regarded as the means of 
transmitting the rules to be followed and also as a device capable of disciplining and 
enabling their following. 
 
The new management accounting systems as carrier of new rules 
The conviction that the new management accounting systems would ‘carry’ into the 
manufacturing area the rules to be followed in everyday interpretations, social relations 
and practices is reflected in the documents and memos describing a ‘Management 26 
Control Project’ (henceforth, MCP) set up in 1995
8. In the memo dealing with the 
‘management control of the manufacturing area’, page 10, it was stated that: 
[The new management control system for manufacturing] will allow for: 
•  (…) 
•  An orientation of (…) manufacturing managers to the tracking of 
costs of the process, by permanently confronting actual values with 
standard ones (…); 
•  (…). 
 
As pointed out before, manufacturing departments were already regarded as cost 
centres, but costs were attributed to them merely to give a cost to products and to value 
inventories: 
The [current] organisation of costs in terms of cost centres aims (…) to 
constitute a basis for the computation of the real cost of products (…), 
which implies a limited utility for management purposes (Internal 
document: ‘Proposal for the functioning of the management control 
system in a perspective of (…) responsibility centres’, page 3).  
  
The use of costs for management purposes was hence an important objective of the new 
system. Specifically, it was hoped that regular comparisons between actual and 
budgeted/standard costs would lead to a cost-consciousness. The same could be said 
about the translation of operational indicators (e.g. levels of stocks or number of 
employees) into financial terms. Hence, departmental managers would be concerned 
with issues of cost control instead of (or, at least, together with) the maximisation of 
production volumes and percentages of capacity usage. 
Eventually, a more fundamental change in rules was sought: as the new systems would 
replace ‘cost centres’ by ‘responsibility centres’.  
Because we believe that organisational results depend above all on 
people, we are conscious that an organisational structure in terms of 
responsibility centres will contribute to the creation of a spirit of 
entrepreneurship in the manager, motivating a constant search for 
improvement in contribution margins and, therefore, in global results 
(Internal document: ‘Proposal for the functioning of the management 
control system in a perspective of (…) responsibility centres’, page 4). 
 
                                                 
8 See appendix 1 for a brief description of this project. 27 
Initially, these principles were to be applied to the main organisational areas, including 
manufacturing. These areas were to be regarded as profit or investment centres, and it 
was hoped that ‘responsibility centre’ reports would carry a financial orientation into 
each of these areas, and would instil in their managers a ‘spirit of entrepreneurship’ and 
a concern for the maximisation of their contribution to Air’s financial results. Hence, in 
the case of manufacturing it was hoped that the PD would manage his area as an 
investment centre. 
 
The new management accounting systems as a technology of discipline and 
production 
Besides being envisaged by their promoters as carriers of new rules to be followed in 
the manufacturing area (as well as in other areas of the organisation), the newly 
introduced management accounting systems were also seen as a means of guaranteeing 
the enactment of those rules in a disciplined and enabled fashion. 
Relating to the theoretical insights of previous sections, it can be argued that the key 
organisational actors in Air aimed at promoting change in the circuit of system 
integration in the manufacturing area. This was so at several levels. Firstly, the concern 
with opening up lines of visibility into the performance of each organisational area was 
clear in the MCP. For instance, rules of orientation to contribution margins were 
expected to be followed by the PD given that a gaze would be directed towards the 
manufacturing area’s contribution to Air’s financial results, and his performance 
evaluation would be based on that contribution.  
(…) the contribution margins statement (…) seeks not only to identify 
the contribution for results of each of the (…) activities of the business 
unit, in a perspective of global financial consequences of their decisions 
(…), but also to render their managers responsible for the factors (…) on 
which they can act (revenues, costs, assets, liabilities) (Internal 
document: ‘proposal for the functioning of the management control 
system in a perspective of (…) responsibility centres’, page 1). 
 
Also, the ‘variance reports’ would open up lines of visibility into the financial 
consequences of the decisions taken by departmental managers, who were to be 
accountable for the variances under their control. 
 28 
[The management accounting system in manufacturing] will allow for: 
a)  The identification of consumptions of raw materials in standard and 
actual terms, and respective [price and efficiency] variances. 
b)  The identification of overhead costs, overall and for each 
manufacturing centre, as well as the respective variances (Internal 
document: ‘management control for the manufacturing area’, page 
10).  
 
Therefore, the new management accounting system was not merely implemented as a 
carrier of rules, but also involved the production of figures and reports that were to be 
used in performance evaluation, thus becoming disciplinary devices capable of 
promoting and enforcing the very enactment of the rules being carried. 
Furthermore, the new management accounting systems introduced in Air were also 
regarded by their promoters as potentially enabling the changes they sought. The failure 
to enact the MCP (see section 5.3 below) was seen as being due, to some extent, to the 
failure of the ‘budgeting’ and ‘responsibility centres’ systems to enable the following of 
rules of financial orientation at a departmental level. In observations and in 
conversations and interviews with manufacturing managers we found that the ‘variance 
reports’ were commonly regarded as useless by those managers. Some of them simply 
ignored the reports because they ‘did not understood’ them. Other managers mentioned 
the lack of timeliness of variance reports as hindering their ability to support everyday 
decisions and actions. On the contrary, the ‘production and quality reports’ sent by the 
PC department were regarded as simple and timely. 
A ‘Restructuring Project’ (henceforth, RP) developed and set up in 1997 aimed at 
enhancing the enabling aspects of the management accounting systems. On the one 
hand, a new IT infrastructure, specifically an ERP system, was proposed with the 
objective (among others) of improving the timeliness of financial information. The 
ultimate objective, as stated by the controller and by the MD, was to develop financial 
performance indicators which would be available ‘on-line’ to manufacturing (and other) 
managers. Also, in 1997 there was a concern with the development of simpler and more 
understandable performance indicators, especially those capable of reflecting the 
financial consequences of everyday decisions and actions, and of aligning them with 
organisational objectives and results. In our visits, we understood from conversations 
with the MD, the CFO and the controller that this concern was still a priority. 29 
Finally, an important aspect of the new systems, and specifically of the ‘responsibility 
centre’ reports outlined in the MCP (see appendix 1), was their ability to render visible 
any problems of a financial nature in the manufacturing area. An important potential 
consequence was the undermining of the PD’s authority over the manufacturing area. 
The Group Leader would probably be less supportive of the PD, and thus the enactment 
of the new representations would be facilitated.  
 
5.3. The resistance to, and decoupling, of the new management accounting 
  systems in Air’s manufacturing area, and the detachment of these systems 
  from the ERP technology 
It was evident in our observations of the production and use of the management 
accounting systems formally implemented following the 1995 MCP that such systems, 
and the representations that underpinned their attempted implementation, were not 
enacted in Air’s manufacturing area. Resources were mobilised, including the hiring of 
a new management accountant, and the reports (the ‘variance reports’ and the ‘report of 
contributions by responsibility centres’ – see appendix 1) were regularly produced in, 
and distributed by, the MC department from early 1996 onwards. However, we 
observed that previously followed rules in the manufacturing area, in essence, remained. 
Manufacturing managers maintained their perception of rules of production orientation 
as the obligatory ones. Their interpretations of their own performance and the 
performance of others was based on such criteria. And their interactions with others, 
their decisions and the measures taken were oriented to objectives such as production 
levels and percentages of capacity usage. This was linked with the general failure of the 
MD and his allies (the CFO and the controller) to enact representations of financial 
orientation in the manufacturing area. Subsequent sections analyse the processes leading 
to this failure, on the basis of the theoretical framework presented in section 4. That is, 
strategies to enact new representations may be constrained by prevailing circuits of 
power, by counter representations and strategies, and by unpredictable contingent 
factors and events. 
 
The strategy conducted by the MD and his allies and the prevailing circuits of 
power in Air’s manufacturing 30 
The prevailing characteristics of the circuit of system integration are crucial in 
explaining the failure of the new management accounting systems to enact new rules in 
manufacturing. Firstly, an alternative set of reports remained the basis for performance 
evaluation and self-discipline: a set of ‘production and quality’ reports produced in the 
PC department, which included indicators that pointed to rules of production 
orientation. In a very emotional manner, a manufacturing manager complained that:  
Yes, there is a lack of awareness of the financial consequences of what 
we do [in manufacturing]. But it is all very nice to talk of financial 
indicators if [in manufacturing] we are dogs and in the end of the leash 
we find someone that does not care [with financial indicators and reports] 
(July 2000).  
 
He later confirmed that he was referring to the PD in this statement. Clearly, 
manufacturing managers were oriented to the rules dictated by the PD, and to the PD’s 
preferred way of assessing their performance – the ‘production and quality reports’ 
produced in the PC department.  
Secondly, the lack of a reliable and integrative IT infrastructure limited the timeliness of 
the systems implemented after the MCP of 1995, and thus the enactment of new 
representations of rules in manufacturing. The reports produced after the MCP were not 
timely: they were distributed on a monthly basis, usually in the third or fourth week of 
the following month. Hence, the events to which they reported were already ‘part of the 
past’ and the information was thus perceived as useless for orienting decisions and 
actions. 
Thirdly, the lack of reliability of the IT in place enhanced the ability of the PD to resist 
the representations proposed by the MD, the CFO and the controller in the period 1995-
1997, and to impose his own representations These involved passing the message 
(especially to the Group Leader) that the new management accounting systems and the 
reports produced by them were not valid ways of assessing the manufacturing area’s 
performance. 
 
Counter-strategies and reshaped strategies in Air’s manufacturing 
It is not only the prevailing configuration of circuits of power, in some static sense, that 
potentially cause resistance to change. The framework presented in section 4 also 31 
suggests a more dynamic perspective for explaining resistance: a configuration of 
circuits of power underlies (either facilitates or hinders) the counter-strategies, reshaped 
strategies and events taking place in the organisation.  
In Air, resistance to the 1995 MCP in the manufacturing area was to a great extent due 
to the rejection of the project by the PD. This rejection, and the strategy that ensued, 
were in turn enabled both by the relative weakness of the strategy deployed by the MD 
and his allies (e.g. the assumption that the new rules implied in the MCP would 
‘automatically’ be accepted by actors to be enrolled – such as the Group Leader and 
manufacturing managers), and in general by the prevailing circuits of power. Above all, 
the PD kept his privileged relationship with the Group Leader and hence his strong 
position as ‘the boss’ in the manufacturing area of Air. And he deployed a strategy to 
insulate performance evaluation in his area from the reports produced in the 
management control department following the 1995 project. 
In the ‘production meetings’ and in conversations with those below him, the PD would 
simply ignore the ‘variance reports’. This was pointed out by several manufacturing 
managers and confirmed in the production meetings we attended in the summer 2000. 
The manufacturing managers were very aware that their performance was assessed on 
the basis of production measures included in the ‘production and quality reports’. 
To create a ‘buffer’ between the management accounting systems and the performance 
evaluation of his area, the PD relied on the trust and protection of the Group Leader. 
Clearly, the special relationship between these two actors remained in the years after 
1995 and still presisted at the time of our first two visits. This meant that the PD had 
total authority over manufacturing in Air. The controller recognised in several 
interviews that this caused an inability of others to intervene in the manufacturing area. 
For example, he stated that ‘conditions were not yet met’ for new types of evaluation to 
be implemented. Later, the controller confirmed what was at stake in his previous 
statements. As long as the PD and his management style prevailed in manufacturing, 
changes were not possible. In the words of the controller, the PD did not believe in a 
style of ‘management by financial numbers’
9. 
                                                 
9 It should be emphasised that there is no moral judgment in this paper on the strategies conducted in Air. 
To judge, for instance, that the PD’s strategies were ‘divisive or illegitimate’ would imply that some kind 
of ‘natural’ legitimacy applies to strategies and objectives defined by the MD and his allies. Here, 
however, we simply describe the emergence of alternative representations in Air in the mid-1990’s – one 
defended by the PD and the other promoted by the MD (and his allies – the CFO and the controller) – and 32 
The privileged relationship between the PD and the Group Leader, and thus the 
authority of the PD over the manufacturing area, was also reproduced through a 
successful management of meanings. Specifically, the PD attempted to create the image 
that he was irreplaceable and that his absence would mean a loss of control over 
operations. The MD’s and the Group Leader’s ignorance of Air’s industrial processes 
reinforced this image. Also probably important was the fact that such processes – very 
specific in comparison with other organisations in the sector – had been developed in a 
very painstaking manner through time and the PD had assumed an important role in 
their development. 
Nevertheless, the reporting of ‘contribution by responsibility centres’ could undermine 
the authority of the PD. If such reports were capable of showing that the contribution of 
manufacturing was poor, it was likely that the Group Leader would become less 
supportive of the PD, and changes in manufacturing might be demanded. Indeed, this 
was an important component of the strategy deployed in 1995 by the MD and his allies. 
However, the PD was able to resist this strategy. In meetings at which the Group Leader 
and other senior managers were present, the PD would cast doubt on the reliability of 
the ‘responsibility centre reports’ by presenting alternative figures. This was facilitated 
by the fact that the information systems in place were very unreliable (see above). Also, 
the PD often presented operational measures showing positive performance that 
countered the figures in the responsibility reports. Finally, he would often advance the 
idea that the ‘contribution margin’ of his area was hindered by problems created by the 
commercial area: namely the usually unreliable character of long-term and even short-
term demand forecasts.  
In 1997 the configuration of circuits of power in Air’s manufacturing area remained 
unchanged. The principles of financial orientation had not been imposed as the rules 
underlying interactions and practices in manufacturing: to a great extent because of the 
failure to enrol the PD to those representations. The management accounting systems 
proposed to enforce and enable the following of the ‘new’ rules failed to replace the 
‘production and quality’ reports that the PD’s preferred rules. Available technologies, 
such as the IT infrastructure, were also not facilitative of the enrolling strategy. 
                                                                                                                                               
the way attempts to impose them unfolded. No moral judgment is passed on the relative goodness or 
badness of these representations. ‘What is good and what is bad’ is not something external to the power 
strategies but it is exactly what is at stake in those strategies. 33 
The 1997 RP had a much more high profile and was an elaborate attempt by the MD 
and his allies to enact their representations in the whole organisation, including the 
manufacturing area. New material conditions were created – including the 
implementation of a new integrated IT infrastructure, an ERP system – and the 
problematisation was much more careful. Attempts were made to persuade the PD, and 
also the Group Leader and manufacturing managers, about the problems and solutions 
presented. 
Once more, however, the PD undertook a counter-strategy. In the circumstances, the PD 
did not seem to oppose the project as a whole. During the summer of 1997 he did not 
challenge the RP or any of its measures. If the PD had directly confronted the project at 
that time, he would probably have signalled to others his opposition to a project whose 
terms were generally accepted as positive for the organisation. However, he later 
undertook a strategy that countered some of the RP’s measures; namely those 
attempting to impose an ‘assessment system’ based on financial indicators developed by 
the MC and the Human Resources departments
10. 
The resistance of the PD to the changes being proposed became apparent when, in late 
1997, few months after the RP was launched, and when the ERP selection process was 
beginning, the PD left the organisation.  
I would say that given the subsequent facts [the PD] was not enthusiastic 
[about the RP]. He left in November, a few months after the model was 
decided – in August (the controller, July 2001). 
 
[The MD] asked [other top managers]: ‘are you in the project’? And of 
course they said they were. But two months later [the PD] left. (the ERP 
project champion, July 2001) 
 
                                                 
10 This is one area in which methodological issues are especially sensitive. Information on the counter-
strategy deployed by the PD could not be collected (and was not collected) in interviews and 
conversations with him, for the very simple reason that the researchers are not ‘outside and above’ 
circuits of power. In other words, the PD would probably not recognise that he deployed a counter-
strategy, since this was illegitimate behaviour – given membership work in his dialogue with the 
researchers. Hence, we based our analysis of the counter-strategies of the PD on two sources: observation 
of events in the years after the project; and the memory of episodes and conversations of other 
interviewees, some very near the PD, which we systematically attempted to cross-check in subsequent 
conversations and interviews. While accepting that this may raise methodological reservations, we would 
argue that any study of power in organisations will normally suffer from such problems: not all strategies 
of power will have material ‘inscriptions’ supporting and describing them, especially those that clash with 
prevailing acceptable rules. 34 
This move seemed to represent a kind of tactical retreat, as the PD kept regular contact 
with the organisation, via the Group Leader and the MD. While away from the 
organisation, the PD continued managing meanings, by taking advantage of the Group 
Leader’s and the MD’s lack of knowledge and control of the manufacturing area. For 
instance, he was involved, during this period, in important changes in the factory’s 
processes. In meetings with the MD and the Group Leader, he would identify problems 
in the manufacturing area (e.g. some poor decisions regarding production planning and 
some doubtful investments being proposed) which were felt because of his absence: 
thus reinforcing the idea that he was irreplaceable. 
The PD returned to Air in the summer of 1998 at the instigation of the Group Leader, as 
confirmed by several interlocutors. For instance, the ERP project champion stated that: 
[The PD] came back [to Air, in 1998] because [the Group Leader] put 
him there (July 2001). 
 
Also, the PD’s return was seen by the MD himself as a necessary step for the success of 
the RP, and specifically of the ERP project. The extensive knowledge of Air’s rather 
idiosyncratic production process that the PD was seen as possessing was necessary for 
the enactment of the operational aspects of the RP and the success of the organisation. 
At this point, an important change took place: the MD put the ERP project under the 
leadership of the PD. In explaining this change to us, the MD pointed out that the PD, 
by leading the ERP implementation, would be visibly responsible for the outcome of the 
project. This would probably create dispositions in the (especially problematic) 
manufacturing area to accept the new IT. Furthermore, the MD expected that the 
implementation of the ERP would be capable of enforcing and enabling some change of 
the rules in manufacturing. That is, the integrative features of such systems were 
represented by the MD as promising some operational gains (e.g. better management of 
stocks and improved lead times).  
The appointment of the PD as leader of the ERP implementation project – and indeed 
the PD’s return to the organisation – signalled a reshaped strategy on the part of the 
MD. This was recognised by the MD himself, and by other senior managers that were 
present in board meetings at the time. In an interview, the MD stated that he was aware 
that the PD’s return would hinder the enactment of the ‘management assessment 
system’ based on financial indicators that was proposed in the RP. Human Resources 35 
managers were not given authority to build, for instance, a performance evaluation 
system for the factory based on objective, formally accepted, criteria. Probably because 
of this the turnover of Human Resources managers was high: two managers of the 
Human Resources department were hired and then left the organisation between 1997 
and 2000. At the time of our last visit, a third manager had been hired.  
In general, the principles of the MCP were dropped by the MD, as recognised by the 
controller and by the CFO. The interest of these two actors in the ERP implementation, 
and even in the RP project, was very limited after the PD assumed the project. For 
instance, it was at this point that a decision not to involve management accountants in 
the project was made by the controller. In the summer of 2001, he told us the reasons 
for this: 
I would not waste my department’s resources when conditions were not 
met for the [management accounting] systems to be implemented in the 
ERP system. (…) And the PD made sure that [my subordinates] would 
not be involved. For instance, he knew that I would not put [my 
subordinates] working full-time on the project. But when he presented 
his plans for the implementation, everybody in the team was there [on a] 
full-time [basis]. 
  
Hence, the ERP was implemented as a strictly operational system, and its potential in 
terms of management accounting was not explored. The MC department was not 
involved in the ERP implementation. The reports compiled in the MC department (for 
the sales companies and the commercial area, and also the – decoupled – variance 
reports), continued to be produced using parallel databases. The production of the 
‘contribution by responsibility centres’ report ceased at about this time. 
The composition of the teams also reflected the PD’s interest in keeping control and 
authority over manufacturing.  
In manufacturing, they did not want to loose power. (…) That is why 
some people were in the project, and that’s why there was pressure from 
[the PD] in order for them to be the masters of what was implemented. 
The ‘industrial data group’ was formed. (…) And the objective was to 
make them retain all the know-how (the ERP project champion, July 
2001). 
 
This ‘industrial data group’ was composed exclusively of members of the PC 
department. Their involvement implied that the preparation of the ‘production and 36 
quality reports’ was improved after the system was implemented in the headquarters (in 
June 1999). As pointed out by two manufacturing managers, those reports were now 
available to the PD much sooner than before, and sometimes these managers were 
confronted with figures from the previous month in the first few days of the following 




The effect of unpredictable factors and events 
Unpredictable events can also have a bearing on the fate of proposed representations in 
organisations. The following examples from Air’s case very briefly illustrate this point. 
As pointed out above, the PD could challenge certain management accounting reports in 
board meetings, given the problems with their reliability. To some extent, these 
problems were due to the characteristics of IT in place (see above). However, these 
reliability problems were also caused by the inexperience of the management 
accountant hired to develop the reports. Mistakes made by this individual were detected 
in some of the board meetings. These mistakes were unpredictable factors that 
concurred with the image of non-reliability that the Group Leader attached to the new 
management accounting systems. 
Also, the return of the PD to the organisation, in early 1998, was due to some extent to a 
perception – by the Group Leader and by the MD – that the ERP project was delayed or 
even not under control. The point here is that such a perception was reinforced by some 
contingent events in the early months of the ERP project. The process of selecting a 
software vendor was extremely long (see Ribeiro, 1999), and the early stages of the 
implementation were marked by unexpected delays. Also, the extremely short time 
frame – given the year 2000 problem (an important contingent factor) – was seen as 
dangerous for the success of the implementation. With the PD leading the project, it was 
expected that the implementation of the ERP could be smoother, especially in the 
complex and problematic manufacturing area.  
                                                 
11 The ‘production and quality reports’ were the object of detailed analysis by the PD and each 
manufacturing managers in the third week of each month. However, at the time of our visits the PD had 
access to those reports usually in the first week of the month. After a brief glance at these reports, he 
would often personally go to the factory and discuss relevant figures/issues with the manufacturing 
managers. Given the potential of the new system, he stated that he was even planning to ask the PC 
department to produce weekly reports and to trigger formal meetings on a weekly basis. 37 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has reported an in-depth longitudinal case study conducted in a Portuguese 
manufacturing organisation in which an attempt to promote change through 
management accounting was conducted in recent years. Starting from an overall 
motivation to study processes of organisational change in the rich context in which they 
take place, the study has moved to a concern with explaining some puzzles arising in 
the first (pilot) visit to the organisation. Why were newly introduced formal 
management accounting systems becoming detached from everyday interactions and 
practices, especially in the manufacturing area of the organisation? Why was the 
implementation of a high-profile IT infrastructure (an ERP system) conducted quite 
separately from management accounting and accountants?  
We presented a theoretical framework capable of supporting the analysis in the present 
and in future case studies of management accounting change in organisations. In this 
framework, processes of organisational change, and resistance to it, were conceptualised 
as being linked with the phenomenon of power. But the perspective on power adopted 
here is not conventional. It is a strategic Machiavellian conception that considers the 
importance of rules and material conditions in shaping the powers of different actors 
and groups and in facilitating or restricting their strategies to gain in power. 
New management accounting systems were formally introduced in Air in the context of 
strategies of power conducted by some key organisational actors – the MD and his allies 
– to enact their preferred representations in the organisation. These representations 
involved following of the rules of financial orientation (i.e., orientation to organisational 
financial results) in all times and spaces in the organisation. The new management 
accounting systems introduced by those actors were regarded by them as capable of 
introducing new rules and disciplining and enabling their following. New rules would 
be suggested by performance measures included in the systems. Disciplinary effects 
could be created by the ability of these systems to open up lines of visibility into the 
(financial) performance of each department/area. Enabling effects would be created if 
the measures and figures produced were capable of driving decisions and actions, 
especially if they were understandable and timely. 38 
The systems introduced were, however, resisted and decoupled in the manufacturing 
area of the organisation. Previous rules of orientation to production measures, such as 
production volumes and capacity usages, continued to be followed in everyday 
interactions and practices. This was linked to the observation that a set of ‘production 
and quality reports’ kept open lines of visibility into the performance of manufacturing 
departments, and were used in evaluating the performance of these departments and 
their managers. They clearly constituted the source of obligatory rules to be followed in 
the manufacturing area. On the contrary, management accounting reports were 
neglected by manufacturing managers, and failed to become a carrier and/or discipliner 
and/or enabler of new rules in the manufacturing area.  
Several reasons led to the failure of the new management accounting systems. One 
thing to note is that the new management accounting systems proposed in 1995 were 
limited in their potential as technologies of production, no least because of the lack of 
reliable and integrated IT (a characteristic of the circuit of system integration). These 
systems were difficult to interpret by manufacturing managers and their subordinates, 
and very untimely. Also, a strategic actor in the organisation – the PD – who was the 
head of the manufacturing area, was not enrolled to the representations proposed by the 
MD and his allies. This actor did not believe in the adequacy of financial information to 
manage manufacturing operations, and thus neglected the reports prepared by the MC 
department as a means of managing his area. Further, he also deployed proactive 
strategies in order to keep his privileged position in the organisation and his ability to 
dictate the rules to be followed in the manufacturing area. His (counter-) strategies were 
enhanced by the configuration of the circuits of power in Air, and by some contingent 
events during the period studied. We have also shown that the counter-strategies of the 
PD, enhanced as they were by the configuration of circuits of power in the organisation 
and by some contingent events, ultimately explained the failure of the newly introduced 
ERP system to have any real impact on management accounting. 
The study also brings about some theoretical consequences for so-called ‘institutional 
theories in management accounting’ (see for instance Burns, 2000b). Specifically, the 
case may be used to address the concept of ‘decoupling’ in New Institutional Sociology. 
Further, it involves a conceptualisation of the sedimentation of rules in social systems, 
and of power, that may be confronted with the one expressed in OIE-inspired work. 
These aspects are tackled elsewhere (Ribeiro and Scapens, 2004). Finally, Air’s case 39 
points to a refuting of a technological determinist perspective on the relationship 
between ERP systems and management accounting in organisations. Many studies 
attempt to list the potential impacts of these systems on organisations (e.g. Anastas, 
1997; Cooper and Kaplan, 1998; Scapens et al., 1998; Granlund and Malmi, 2002). 
However, in Air, it was the specific context of the organisation and the idiosyncratic 
processes that unfolded in the period studied that explained ‘what the system became’. 
The conceptualisation of ERP systems as a device involved in strategies and counter-
strategies of power allowed us to make sense of its lack of relationship with 
management accounting and accountants. Further, this conceptualisation and its 
explanatory power in Air’s case replicates the perspective of these systems as ‘triggers 
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APPENDIX 1 – THE MANAGEMENT CONTROL PROJECT IN AIR (1995) 
The MCP was developed in 1995. Overall, the new project was based on the concept of 
the contribution which the various areas of the organisation make to the overall 
financial results. It was expected that, by rendering visible such contributions, managers 
at different levels would orient their decisions and actions to the improvement of 
organisational results. In manufacturing, this implied a break from previous practices of 
management accounting which were limited to the calculation of total product costs for 
external reporting purposes. The new management accounting system for manufacturing 
proposed in 1995, and formally implemented in subsequent years, involved the 
following innovations: 
-  A system of ‘responsibility centres’ which breaks the organisation into its major 
areas: the administrative area (financial accounting department, MC department, 
control of payments and receivables), the manufacturing area (including support 
departments, such as the PC, and the factory), the commercial area, and the sales 
companies. This system was based on profit centres and, when and where 
possible, investment centres. On the basis of standard transfer prices (with 
manufacturing ‘selling’ to the commercial area and to the sales companies, 
which in turn sold to the market), and of an assessment of the costs of fixed and 
working capital, the ‘contribution margins’ of each area would be calculated and 
compared with the budget/standard. Such a report would be presented and 
discussed in board meetings. 
-  A conventional ‘budgeting system’ for the various cost centres was also 
proposed. This system was based on (1) estimates of sales volumes and prices 
prepared by the sales companies and the commercial area in Portugal; and (2) 
estimates of fixed overhead costs by each department/cost centre. The 
computation of variable costs (comprising materials and electricity) would be 
undertaken in the MC department, on the basis of the sales budget and the 
standards for the production of each product. Monthly ‘variance reports’ would 
then be distributed to manufacturing managers, showing variances for which 
each department would supposedly be accountable (e.g. fixed costs compared to 
budget; variable costs compared to standard). Also, these reports would include 
such non-financial indicators as the level of stocks and the number of 
employees, translated into financial terms; 45 
-  It was expected that the system of ‘responsibility centres’ would eventually be 
applied at a less aggregated departmental level. For instance, the controller 
explained that the objective was to apply the system of responsibility centres and 
standard transfer prices to each of three factory departments – ‘basic products’; 
‘intermediate finishing’; and ‘final finishing’. These reports would then be 
distributed to the manufacturing managers responsible for those departments, in 
order to orient their decisions and actions. However, he explained that such a 
development was not planned for the initial stages of the project, given 
limitations in IT. This was confirmed in the project documents which were 
collected:  
The development of the responsibility centres to a  departmental level of 
analysis (…) [will take place only] if it is   considered  necessary,  useful 
and possible’ (Internal document:   ‘Proposal for the functioning of the 
management control system  [of] contributions by centres of 
responsibility’, page 1). 
 
There was a concern within the project with rendering visible the performance of each 
area of the organisation in terms of its contribution to results (‘contribution to results’ 
being defined as the contribution margin of each area, calculated on the basis of 
standard transfer prices, variable and fixed costs, and costs of fixed and working 
capital). The ‘budgeting system’ meant that some attempts were also made to instil a 
level of financial orientation, i.e. of cost-consciousness, at the departmental level. In 
short, the new management accounting systems were a means of promoting both the 
visibility of manufacturing performance as a whole, and the enactment of a financial 
orientation at a more disaggregated level.  Working papers mais recentes 
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